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REAL WORLD PROBLEMS OF VIRTUAL CRIME
BERYL A. HOWELL
Theoretical debates about how best to address cybererime
have their place, but, in the real world, companies and
individuals face new harmful criminal activity that poses unique
technical and investigatory challenges. One of the greatest
challenges posed by this new technology is how to combat
wrongdoing effectively without netting innocent actors. This
Article will present three case studies drawn from recent high-
profile news stories to illustrate the pitfalls of legislating in the
e-crimes arena.
Theoretical debates about how best to address cybercrime
have their place, but, in the real world, companies and
individuals face new harmful criminal activity that poses unique
technical and investigatory challenges. There is nothing virtual
about the real damage on-line crime can inflict off-line to
victims. At the same time, technology is inviting uses that may
result in significant, though sometimes inadvertent, criminal
and civil liability. The law is not always crystal clear about
whether specific conduct is a crime, or about which tools
investigators may use to collect evidence identifying the scope of
the criminal activity and the perpetrator. In this Article, three
stories based on real-life cases are described that highlight
murky areas of the law.
At the risk of spoiling the suspense, let me make the
moral of these stories plain at the outset: specific laws directed
to specific problems are important for two main reasons. First,
they serve to guide law enforcement as to how investigations
may be conducted with appropriate respect for civil liberties and
privacy. Second, specific laws make clear to people the boundary
of legally permissible conduct.
Does this require endless effort to update the laws to keep
pace with technology? Yes, but Congress returns every year with
the job of making new laws. Will the pace of legal changes
always be behind technological developments? Yes, but in my
view the correct pace is a slow one. By the time a proposal has
104 2004-2005
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gone through the legislative process, the problem it seeks to
address will have become more defined. Policy-makers are better
able to craft a narrow and circumscribed law to address a clearly
defined problem, and thus, minimize the risk of an overly
expansive law that could chill innovation and technological
development.
I. THE CASE OF THE SNOOPING STAFFERS AND PEEKING
POLITICO
When Does Snooping Cross the Legal Line of Computer
Abuse?
The first case-study arises from a computer investigation
recently conducted within the Committee on the Judiciary of the
United States Senate. The facts of this case are quite simple. In
November 2003, conservative newspapers and a website - the
Wall Street Journal editorial page, the Washington Times, and
the Coalition for a Fair Judiciary - published excerpts from
approximately 19 internal staff memoranda to Democratic
Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee.' As is frequently
the case with instances of computer security breaches, the scope
of the breach is usually far more serious than the initial problem
suggests. Indeed, these nineteen leaked memoranda were just
the tip of the iceberg.
The Senate Sergeant of Arms conducted a limited
"administrative, fact-finding inquiry" at the bipartisan request
of the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and Senior
Democratic Members into the circumstances surrounding the
theft of the Democratic staff memoranda. 2 The report of the
inquiry (the "Pickle Report") revealed that a staffer for Senator
Hatch and a staffer for Majority Leader Frist had, on a daily
basis for almost 18 months, methodically accessed files of
1 See, e.g., Review & Outlook, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2003, at
A12; The Case Was Fixed, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2003, at A01; Press
Release, The Committee for Justice, Fact Sheet: The Democratic Judicial
Memo Investigation (Jan. 22, 2004), at http://committeeforjustice.org/cgi-
data/press/files/10.shtml (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
2 SERGEANT OF ARMS U.S. SENATE, 108TH CONG., REPORT ON
THE INVESTIGATION INTO IMPROPER ACCESS TO THE SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE'S COMPUTER SYSTEM, at 7 (2004) [hereinafter "Pickle Report"].
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targeted Democratic staffers working on judicial nominations,
taking almost 4,700 documents in the process. 3 Evidence was
uncovered that the Hatch and Frist staffers took steps to cover
their tracks and conceal their theft of the Democratic staff
memoranda, including keeping the stolen documents in a
zipped, i.e. compressed, password-protected folder on the Hatch
staffer's computer. 4
The Committee file server was shared by both Democrats
and Republicans, with each staffer having his or her own
account, associated with a personal electronic folder for storage
of documents or other data. Staff working for the same Senator
had permission to share certain files among themselves, but no
other Members' staffs were permitted to see these files. 5 At least
that is how the permissions had worked, were understood to
work, and were supposed to work. However, when a new
systems administrator had been hired in 2001, he did not set the
permissions protocol correctly for over half of the staff on the
Committee, so the files in those accounts were accessible to any
user with access to the server.6
One might think the discovery that Republican staffers
were snooping through the internal and confidential memoranda
among Democratic staff and Members would have the effect of
throwing gas on an already simmering partisan fire.
Interestingly, that is not what happened. Instead, virtually
every Committee Member from both sides of the aisle agreed
that this spying was an appalling breach of both confidentiality
and custom.
There has been public debate, however, about whether a
crime had been committed, which is somewhat ironic since this
incident involved the Committee responsible for crafting the
original Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") as well as
every amendment to that law for the past decade. 7 Was the
unauthorized access by the Republican staffers simply immoral
or was it a crime?
Former White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray, the
Chairman of the Committee for Justice, former Majority Leader
3 Id. at 9.
4 Id. at 8.
5 Id. at 18.
6 Id. at 11.
7 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2004).
106 2004-2005
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Trent Lott, and others have asserted that no crime was
committed since the improperly configured security settings on
the Committee file server provided easy access.8 The Committee
for Justice promulgated a "fact sheet" asserting that no crime
occurred because there was no "hacking."9
Yet, by its plain terms, the CFAA prohibits both
unauthorized access, which is colloquially called "hacking," and
exceeding authorized access of "protected computers."10
"Hacking" is not a defined term, nor even used in the law.
"Unauthorized access" is also not defined in the law, while the
8 Letter to the Editor from C. Boyden Gray, Chairman of
Committee for Justice, Faulty Judiciary Network: Let's Establish the Facts
(Dec. 23, 2003) in WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2003, at A15 (quoting Mr. Gray as
stating, "The Democrats designed a faulty 'shared network' where files could
be accessed freely by staffers of either party; if you had material you wanted
kept completely confidential, you were advised to store it on your own hard
drive. No one exceeds their authority when they log on and access files on
their own computer's desktop. Democrats, in other words, were the ones who
disclosed their own documents, which were in fact entirely unrestricted.").
See also Charlie Savage, GOP Downplays Reading of Memos,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 23, 2004, at A3, available
at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2004/01/23/gop-downplays-
reading of memos/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2004); Alexander Bolton, Leak Staffer
Ousted, Frist Aide Forced Out in an Effort to Assuage Dems, THE HILL, Feb.
5, 2004, available at http://www.hillnews.com/news/020504/leak.aspx
(quoting Senator Trent Lott (R-Miss.) as stating, "[r]ight now I think that
was pretty unfair... I don't have the impression he did anything wrong... I
don't know the details, but I would not be a friend in firing a highly qualified
staffer") (last visited Nov. 9, 2004); Geoff Earle, Leak Probe Expands;
Santorum Assails Signs Investigation Targets GOP Aides, THE HILL, Feb. 11,
2004, available at http://www/hillnews.com/news/021104/probe.aspx (quoting
Senator Santorum as stating, "[ilf there's anything criminal, it's the behavior
of the Democrats") (last visited Nov. 9 2004); Dahlia Lithwick, Memogate,
SLATE .COM, Feb. 19, 2004, at http://www.slate.com/id/2095770 (reporting
"some conservative groups claim that no crime occurred.") (last visited Nov. 9,
2004).
9 The Committee for Justice, supra note 1 (regarding the
appropriateness of the Sergeant of Arms' investigation, "It was a mistake to
give credence to the Democrat complaint that any impropriety had occurred
with regard to the disclosure of these documents to the press ... if Senate
computers were hacked into, a law might have been violated... Was there a
'hacking'? No, it appears not . . . the documents in question were
inadvertently disclosed and obtained off an unsecured shared network
accessible to both Democrat and Republican Judiciary Committee staff... In
short, there was no breaking and entering. Staffers were entitled to access
their own desktop computers and the committee network on which the
documents were inadvertently disclosed.")
10 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (2004).
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phrase "exceeds authorized access" is broadly defined to mean
"to access a computer with authorization and to use such access
to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accessor
is not entitled so to obtain or alter."11 The CFAA contains
absolutely no requirement that data be secured and rendered
inaccessible to unauthorized users to enjoy the protection of the
statute. 12 On the contrary, this statute imposes misdemeanor
criminal liability for merely obtaining information stored on a
computer system by accessing a computer without authorization
or by exceeding authorized access. 13
The shrill partisanship voiced both by some Senators who
do not serve on the Judiciary Committee, and by outside groups,
obscured the fairly simple legal questions posed in the Peeking
Politicos debacle: (1) did the surreptitious accessing, reading,
and copying of Democratic staff memoranda on multiple
occasions over a period of months by Republican staff constitute
"obtaining information" within the meaning of the CFAA; (2) did
this activity by Senator Hatch's staffer, who was authorized to
use the Senate Judiciary server, fall within the CFAA's
prohibition of exceeding authorized access; and (3) did directions
by Majority Leader Frist's staffer to Senator Hatch's staffer to
engage in this activity run afoul of the CFAA's prohibition on
unauthorized access?
The plain terms of the statute appear to provide
affirmative responses to these questions, a conclusion
corroborated by explanations of the intended scope of the law
found in the legislative history. Over the last twenty years, the
CFAA has undergone several significant amendments that have
expanded the law's range from covering only government and
financial institution computers to covering virtually every
computer connected to the Internet. Further, there has been
11 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2004).
12 The Computer Fraud and Abuse statute, in pertinent part,
bars (1) intentionally accessing a computer; (2) to obtain information from
"any department or agency of the United States," which is defined at 18
U.S.C. § 1030(e)(7) to include "the legislative or judicial branches of the
Government"; (3) "without authorization" or by "exceeding authorized access,"
which is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) to mean accessing a computer with
authorization but to use such access to obtain or alter information in the
computer that the accesser is not entitled to obtain or alter.
13 18 U.S.C. §1030(c)(2)(A). This illegal activity may also be a
felony offense with up to 5 years imprisonment if committed for commercial
advantage, private financial gain, in furtherance of any criminal or tortuous
act, or if the value of the information exceeded $5,000.
108 2004-2005
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added a civil cause of action as an enforcement mechanism to
supplement the criminal penalties for significant breaches. As
originally enacted in 1984, the CFAA penalized: (1) knowingly
obtaining classified information, 14 financial records, or credit
histories in financial institutions;15 (2) using, altering, or
destroying any government information 16  by accessing a
computer without authorization; and (3) "having accessed a
computer with authorization, us[ing] the opportunity such
access provided for purposes to which such authorization does
not extend."17
The conduct prohibited by "unauthorized access" is
"analogous to that of 'breaking and entering'."18 By contrast, the
conduct barred by exceeding authorized access was intended "to
make it a criminal offense for anyone who has been authorized
to use a computer to access it knowing the access is for a
purpose not contemplated by the authorization. As a result, it
prohibits access to a computer to obtain the described data when
the perpetrator knows that the access is not authorized or that it
is not within the scope of a previous authorization." 19 On the
other hand, information obtained only incidentally, "pursuant to
an express or implied authorization," or in accordance with
"normal and customary business procedures and information
usage" is not covered. 20
The cumbersome phrase used in the original CFAA -
"having accessed a computer with authorization, uses the
opportunity such access provided for purposes to which such
authorization does not extend" - was condensed to the current
14 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) (1984) (enacted as part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, P.L. 98-473, 1984).
15 Id. at (a)(2).
16 Id. at (a)(3) (penalizing "Whoever ... knowingly accesses a
computer without authorization, or having accessed a computer with
authorization, uses the opportunity such access provides for purposes to
which such authorization does not extend, and by means of such conduct
knowingly uses, modifies, destroys, or discloses information in, or prevents
authorized use of, such computer, if such computer is operated for or on
behalf of the Government of the United States and such conduct affects such
operation.").
17 Id. at (a)(1)-(3).
18 COUNTERFEIT ACCESS DEVICE AND COMPUTER FRAUD AND
ABUSE ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 21 (1984) reprinted in 1984





HOWELL: REAL WORLD PROBLEMS OF VIRTUAL CRIME
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2005
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
language of "exceeds unauthorized access" in order "merely to
clarify the language in existing law"21 and "simplify the
language." 22 Inadvertent or mistaken access to computer files
which a person is not authorized to view does not run afoul of
the law. The Senate Judiciary Committee acknowledged that
distinguishing "between conduct that is completely inadvertent
and conduct that is initially inadvertent but later becomes an
intentional crime" may be "a difficult line to draw in the area of
computer technology because of the possibility of mistakenly
accessing another's computer files." 23 Yet, both the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees authorizing this criminal statute
made clear that exploiting access that was unauthorized would
not be excused, even if the initial discovery of the means to such
access was inadvertent or accidental. The Senate Judiciary
Committee explained:
[T]he Committee would expect one whose access to
another's computer files or data was truly mistaken
to withdraw immediately from such access. If he
does not and instead deliberately maintains
unauthorized access after a non-intentional initial
21 COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT OF 1986, H.R. REP. No. 99-
612, at 11, (1986) [hereinafter 1986 House Judiciary Report].
22 COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT OF 1986, S.R. REP. No 99-432, at 9
(1986) [hereinafter 1986 Senate Judiciary Report). The CFAA was first
significantly amended by the next Congress after its initial passage,
including by (1) changing the scienter requirement from "knowingly" to
"intentionally" for the prohibitions in sections (a)(2) and (3) to make amply
clear that only intentional acts were covered and not "mistaken, inadvertent
or careless ones," id. at 5; (2) removing from the prohibition in section (a)(3),
which bars unauthorized access to government computers, coverage of
insiders in order to protect whistleblowers and leaving intradepartmental
trespass to be handled by other applicable laws, id. at 7-8, 20-23 (additional
views of Messrs. Mathias and Leahy); and (3) adding three new offenses in
new subsections (a)(4), (5) and (6). While subsection (a)(3) continues only to
apply to outside hackers, subsection (a)(2), which bars both outsiders and
insiders from unauthorized access to "protected computers" to obtain
information, was amended in 1996 by the National Information
Infrastructure Protection Act, S. 982, sponsored by Senators Kyl, Leahy and
Grassley, to cover federal government computers within the definition of
"protected computer." The purpose of this amendment was to increase privacy
protection for information stored on government computers in the wake of
public and congressional reports on "[g]overnment employees who abuse their
computer access privileges by snooping through confidential tax returns, or
selling confidential criminal history information from the National Crime
Information Center." 142 CONG. REC. S10889 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Leahy).
23 Id. at 14.
110 2004-2005
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contact, then the Committee believes prosecution is
warranted. The individual's intent may have been
formed after his initial, inadvertent access. But his
is an intentional crime nonetheless, and the
Committee does not wish to preclude prosecution in
such instances. 24
The conduct covered by the term "obtaining information"
has been consistently interpreted to include "mere observation of
the data. Actual asportation, in the sense of physically removing
the data from its original location or transcribing the data, need
not be proved in order to establish a violation of [18 U.S.C. §
1030(a)(2)]."25
The plain terms of the CFAA, as informed by the
legislative history, supports the following analysis of the
Peeking Politicos activity: As the Pickle Report noted, the
"cpractice in the Judiciary Committee is to 'share' certain files
among staff working for the same Senator."26 Each user also
"should have exclusive access to his or her own directory."27 In
short, a Committee staffer is authorized to access his or her
personal folder as well as shared files archived or stored on the
server by staff employed by the same Member for whom that
staffer is employed. This authorization is limited and does not
cover access to, let alone the copying or transfer within or
without the Senate, of private, confidential information from the
archived files of Senators'offices. The latter activities would
exceed any such limited authorized access to the Committee
24 Id.; see also 1986 House Judiciary Report, at 10 ("The
Committee does not intend to prevent prosecution of a person under this
subsection whose initial access was inadvertent but who then deliberatively
maintains access after a non-intentional initial contact").
25 1986 Senate Judiciary Report, at 6-7; see also 1986 House
Judiciary Report, at 10 ("There was some concern evidenced ... by the
Department of Justice and others that the term 'obtains information' .. .
makes this subsection something other than an unauthorized access offense.
The Committee disagreed with this interpretation. THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION ACT OF 1995, S.R. No. 104-357,
at 7 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Senate Judiciary Report] (highlighting that as
used in subsection 1030(a)(2), "the term 'obtaining information' includes
merely reading it. There is no requirement that the information be copied or
transported. This is critically important because, in an electronic
environment, information can be 'stolen without asportation, and the original
usually remains intact").
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server and would likely constitute a misdemeanor violation of
section 1030(a)(2) of the CFAA.
Moreover, directions or requests by a staffer with no
authority to a staffer with limited authority to exceed that
limited authority for purposes of obtaining data on a Committee
server, as the Pickle Report indicated that the Majority Leader's
staffer did, may rise to the level of aiding and abetting a
violation, or itself constitute obtaining unauthorized access. The
prohibition on unauthorized access to federal government
computers does not only apply to persons entirely outside the
government. On the contrary, the Committees authoring the
CFAA explained:
The Committee does not intend to preclude
prosecution under this subsection if, for example, a
Labor Department employee authorized to use
Labor's computers accesses without authorization
an FBI computer. An employee who uses his
department's computer and, without authorization,
forages into data belonging to another department,
is engaged in conduct directly analogous to an
'outsider' tampering with Government computers.
In both cases, the user is wholly lacking in
authority to access or use that department's
computer. The Committee believes criminal
prosecution should be available in such cases. 28
In addition to facing a possible misdemeanor violation, the
activity of the Peeking Politicos may have potential civil liability
repercussions as well. The CFAA authorizes civil actions for
compensatory damages or injunctive relief by any person who
suffers (1) any "damage," which is defined to mean any
impairment to the integrity or availability of data,29 or (2) any
"loss," which is defined to mean any reasonable cost of
responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment and
restoring data, any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other
28 1986 Senate Judiciary Report, at 8.; see also 1986 House
Judiciary Report, at 11 ("The Committee does not intend to exclude under
1030(a)(3) conduct by a Federal employee who is an authorized user, for
example, of a Department of Labor computer but without authority accesses
a Department of Defense computer while at work or in a similar fashion
using his own personal computer at home to access without authority a
Department of Justice computer system").
29 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (e)(8) (2004).
112 2004-2005
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consequential damages incurred because of interruption of
service. 30 The staffers who obtained unauthorized access to the
Democratic staff memoranda may be subject to civil suit for
damages, for example, by the Senate, which has incurred
expenses in the investigation into what happened, including the
costs both of personnel diverted from other duties in the office of
the Sergeant of Arms to focus on the investigation, and of
consultants hired to conduct forensic examinations of the
systems involved.
The scope of the activity covered by the terms "access
without authorization" and "exceeds authorized access" ranges
from simple snooping by authorized users of a network, such as
employees inappropriately accessing confidential personnel files
of other employees or students accessing or altering grades, to
seriously damaging activity, such as the theft of trade secrets or
other confidential information. This leaves enormous discretion
to prosecutors. In a politically charged matter, such broad
discretion may be both unwelcome and uncomfortable. One
commentator recently noted
[i]f it is widely believed that some conduct may technically fall
within the language of the CFAA but should in fact not be
criminal, the law should be amended. Reliance on the
,reasonable exercise' of prosecutorial discretion is not an
adequate response. The text of the statute should reflect such
limits. 3 1
The Pickle Report stopped short of making any
recommendations for the referral of individuals for criminal
violations, but did outline the relevant elements of potentially
applicable criminal offenses. 32 A bipartisan group of Members
referred the matter to the Justice Department, which in turn,
assigned the investigation to the U.S. Attorney for the Southern
30 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) and (e)(11). Notably, the CFAA requires
proof of more elements for civil liability than for criminal liability. The same
conduct that may constitute a misdemeanor criminal charge may not support
civil liability, which requires the plaintiff to show damage to the availability
of data or financial loss.
31 Cybercrime Posting by Joseph Metcalfe, Associate Professor
at the University of Oregon School of Law
(March 22, 2004) at http://hermes.circ.gwu.edu/cgi-
bin/wa?A2=ind0403&L=cybercrime&F=&S=&P=70 (last visited Nov. 10,
2004).
32 Pickle Report, supra note 2, at 13, 59-62.
HOWELL 113
11
HOWELL: REAL WORLD PROBLEMS OF VIRTUAL CRIME
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2005
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
District of New York.33 The ending to this story must await the
prosecutors' decision as to whether a crime was committed.
II. THE CASE OF THE PARENTAL NIGHTMARE
When Does File-Sharing Cross the Legal Line of Child
Porn Distribution ?
In some situations, there may be no question that the
computer activity at issue is a crime, but the technology creates
issues about whether the crime was committed by the computer
user or the computer program.
This story starts one morning a few months ago, when a
suburban Mom's morning coffee was interrupted by a knock at
the door. It was FBI agents announcing they were there to
question, and possibly arrest, the child pornography distributor
living and using a computer in the house. They determined the
computer being used to distribute child porn - a felony to
possess and to distribute - was in the teenage son's room. Like
over 60 million other people, 34 he had installed KaZaa on his
computer. The teenager had then gone searching for erotic
material, which he downloaded in his shared KaZaa folder.
Included in this material were child porn images, which many
other Kazaa users then located and downloaded from his home
computer.
In fact, unbeknownst to the teenager, his machine had
been turned into a supernode on the system. He was unaware of
the option buried in the software to prevent this from happening
and did not change the default settings, which permitted it. So
his machine was being used by many clients and other
supernodes to point to files available for sharing, including child
porn. The teenager technically did not have all of the child porn
files on his computer - which would have been enough for a
felony - but he had an index pointing to other locations with
child porn. This also made his machine a much bigger target for
law enforcement looking for online child porn distributors.
33 Alexander Bolton, Miranda Sues Ashcroft: Former GOP Aide
Strikes Back Over Memogate Scandal, THE HILL, Sept. 14, 2004, available at
http://www.hillnews.com/news/09142004/miranda.aspx (last visited Nov. 10,
2004).
34 SHARMAN NETWORKS, Business Opportunities, at
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Peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing programs make
distribution a passive act, but no less subject to criminal
liability. Many users of P2P programs do not fully realize that
the simple act of selecting files or folders to share on KaZaa
makes them a distributor of all those files, and that the act of
distribution, even if initiated by other users, carries with it hefty
criminal and civil liability under criminal copyright laws, child
porn laws, and laws restricting the distribution of obscene
materials to minors. 35
This was just the beginning of the parents' problems.
They then wanted to find out exactly what the evidence was on
their son's computer. Was he actively sending child porn as e-
mail attachments to others? Was he merely viewing child porn
images online, or was he intentionally storing those images on
his computer? Was he actively posting or uploading child porn
images to any sites? Or was he merely a passive distributor by
virtue of having downloaded the illegal images into a KaZaa
shared folder, with the program enabling other users to activate
the distribution? The answers to these questions could provide a
more complete picture of the nature of the teenager's computer
activity and a context for the activity involving the illegal child
porn images that could be helpful in the defense of their son and
to persuade a prosecutor not to charge him. Finding those
answers required the analytical services of a computer forensic
examiner.
The child porn possession crime is so strict, however, that
forensic examiners and even attorneys have to be careful not to
have such images in their possession. The law treats child porn
essentially like heroin - mere possession, even on behalf of a
client to assist in an investigation or defense - is no exception to
the crime. 36 As one court put it: "Child pornography is illegal
contraband."37 Special protocols have to be followed for forensic
examiners to handle matters involving child porn. These
protocols may, in appropriate circumstances, be negotiated with
the investigating law enforcement agency and may require
35 18 U.S.C. § 1470 (2004).
36 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(5)(B), bars possession of any child porn,
with punishment up to 5 years' imprisonment. The law provides an
affirmative defense if the defendant (1) has fewer than 3 child porn images,
and (2) took prompt steps, without retaining or allowing any person other
than a law enforcement agency to access the image, to destroy each image or
report the matter, and allow access, to law enforcement.
37 U.S. v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 731 (5th Cir. 1995).
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specific direction from the court. 38 Stringent controls may be
placed on the computer forensic examiner, whichwhich limit the
location where the examination takes place, the extent of any
copying of the images and the removal of any work product
resulting from the examination.
Significantly, even if a forensic examination of a computer
reveals that child porn images were not manually downloaded or
saved but, as a result of the computer user viewing the images
online or receiving pop-up advertising with the images, were
stored only in a temporary internet file on the computer, the
user may face criminal liability for possession. Images searched
out, found and viewed on web pages are automatically saved by
the computer's web browser in a browser cache file and stored on
the hard drive, until the contents of that file are deleted by the
user. Courts have upheld convictions for possession of child
pornography for viewing illegal images accessed online, without
any manual downloading or saving of the images onto the
computer. 39
38 Id. at 731 (government refused to allow defendant to copy
charged images of child pornography and defense expert was allowed to
examine the child porn at the offices of the Customs Service, U.S. Attorney's
office or defense counsel's office); Rogers v. State, 113 S.W. 3d 452, 458-59
(Tex. App., 2003) (despite state court direction that defense expert be given
access to and allowed to prepare a cloned copy of the defendant's hard drive
in a child pornography possession prosecution, the local federal prosecutor
advised defense counsel that "obtaining and retaining the mirror image
would be grounds for federal prosecution because federal law did not contain
an exception for discovery in criminal cases;" defense expert conducted
examination in sheriffs office); Glenn Puit, Arrest Threat: Child Porn Copies
Lead to Conflict, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, July 28, 2003 (local prosecutor
threatened to arrest defense counsel for possession of child porn images even
though judge had previously authorized counsel to possess the images in
order to assist his client's defense).
39 United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193, 1198 (10th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1123 (2003) (conviction upheld for possession of files
automatically stored in a browser cache because defendant's "habit of
manually deleting images from the cache files established that eh exercised
control over them"); Commonwealth v. Simone, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 215 (Va.
Cir. Ct.) (child porn images recovered from temporary Internet file on
defendant's computer after he viewed but did not manually save images
sufficient for conviction since he reached out for and controlled the images at
issue); but see United States v. Stulock, 308 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2002)
("one cannot be guilty of possession for simply having viewed an image on a
web site, thereby causing the image to be automatically stored in the
browser's cache, without having purposely saved or downloaded the image");
United States v. Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d 459, 484 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (court
raised without resolving "the issue of whether images viewed on the Internet
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While we still do not know the end of the story of the
Peeking Politicos, the story of the Parental Nightmare ended
happily, since the prosecutor declined to prosecute the juvenile.
The forensic examination of the teenager's computer confirmed
that he did not actively distribute the child porn images, which
were nevertheless accessed and uploaded by other KaZaa users.
Changes are already developing in P2P networks to get
around the liability risks of possessing and distributing illegal
material. One such system involves encrypting the files that a
user wants to share, pushing the encrypted files onto an another
client machine, and then making the decryption key available at
web sites only accessible to Freenet users, along with pointers to
where the material may be found.40 The keys are distributed,
not the material, and the person in possession of the encrypted
material has deniability about what the subject matter of the
encrypted file is. Some in law enforcement are already
anticipating a need for new laws to make it illegal to possess a
deliberately stored decryption key that the user knows relates to
an illegal file. 41
P2P networks actually make the work of investigators
easier, since who is sharing illegal files and how much
distribution is occurring may be tracked.42 In the digital world,
users of P2P networks may find that the technology has taken
them for a ride across legal lines imposed by strict liability laws
for possession and distribution of certain materials, including
child porn and infringing copyrighted works.43
and automatically stored in a browser's temporary file cache are knowingly
'possessed' or 'received"').
40 Geoff Fellows, Peer-to-Peer Networking Issues - An Overview, 1
DIGITAL INVESTIGATION 3-6 (2004).
41 Id., at 6.
42 Id., at 4 ("the structure of peer-to-peer networks presents
opportunities to law enforcement for proactive investigation ... This results..
• in prosecutions not for the mere possession of obscene images but rather for
distribution, a much more serious offense.")
43 While criminal copyright liability requires a "willful" intent, civil
infringement liability is strict.
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III. THE CASE OF THE WIFI SPOOFER
When Does Self-Help Cross the Legal Line of
Unauthorized Access?
The opportunities presented by wireless technologies for
individuals to conceal the origin of communications may make
finding perpetrators of computer crime more difficult, as
demonstrated by this final story. For about two years, a
company was the target of embarrassing e-mails containing
derogatory and sexually explicit patents as attachments. These
e-mails were not sent to the company, but worse, sent to the
company's clients with spoofed (i.e., faked) e-mail addresses to
make the e-mails appear to have come from senior executives
within the company. The company's clients did not like receiving
these disturbing spoofed e-mails, particularly when the company
appeared to be incapable of stopping them, and some clients
took their business elsewhere.
The e-mail header information on the e-mails showed the
originating IP addresses, which the FBI attempted to trace. The
traces, however, did not lead back to the perpetrator, but to
random home users' wireless access points to which the
perpetrator had gained access. This access was gained by a
practice known as "war driving." The perpetrator would drive
his car around residential neighborhoods with a laptop equipped
with a WIFI card and antenna, searching for unprotected
wireless access points to which he could connect. A typical home
wireless access point will transmit its signal several hundred
feet, well beyond the home's walls. By the time the FBI was able
to obtain the subscriber information and location of the WIFI
point used by the perpetrator, the perpetrator was, of course,
long gone. Wireless access point equipment is sold with no
security features enabled to block unauthorized access as the
default setting. Many users do not bother, do not wish, or do not
know how, to change the default settings on the equipment to
block such unauthorized access. This equipment also has the
capability to maintain a log identifying the MAC address of
every computer accessing the Internet through the WIFI point,
but again this log must be activated by the user. Even when
access points that the perpetrator co-opted were examined, there
were no logs of his particular computer having connected to
them. This provided a perfect method for the perpetrator to
ensure the anonymity of his e-mail messages.
118 2004-2005
16
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 7 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol7/iss1/5
REAL WORLD PROBLEMS OFVIRTUAL CRIME
In addition to war driving, this perpetrator also sent
spoofed e-mails from computer labs at various universities in the
D.C. area, using false or stolen student accounts, also making
him difficult to trace. He used the hijacked student accounts to
access a proxy server to conceal the originating IP address of the
computer he was using within the University computer lab, and
used that proxy server to access e-mail accounts, to which he
had obtained unauthorized access at AOL and Yahoo, from
which he sent spoofed e-mails.
Almost two years into this expensive harassment, the
company turned to my firm for assistance. At that point, the
company did not know whether the WIFI Spoofer was one
person or a group, a malicious insider or outsider, what the
person/persons wanted or what was motivating the harassment.
Most of all, the company wanted the damaging e-mail campaign
to stop.
Extensive computer forensic analysis of the company's
computers and systems helped to rule out a malicious insider as
the perpetrator of the e-mail campaign. This analysis revealed,
however, a number of unauthorized logins to the company's
server over a four-month period in 2003 with originating IP
addresses used at a local university. Steps were taken to lock
down the security of the company's network.
Sometimes technology has to take a back seat to good old
gumshoe work. Through a combination of interviews with people
in the industry, including competitors of the targeted company,
and government agency personnel involved in patent file
production, plus use of a clinical psychologist with expertise in
developing detailed profiles based upon text and e-mails, a
primary suspect was identified within several weeks.
Over the course of the investigation, we discovered that
senior executives at a sister company of the targeted company
had received e-mails from a person complaining about the
targeted company. Textual and psychological analysis by the
clinical psychologist demonstrated that the author of the spoofed
e-mails was the same author sending the complaining e-mails
(under a fake name) to the sister company. The psychologist
further determined that a single author, not a group, was
involved. But who was this person and how were we going to
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We sent the complainer an e-mail to see if he would re-
engage in communications with representatives of the sister
company. In order to find out the IP address of the computer
where the email was opened, a technical tool, called a web bug,
was used to capture the IP address of the computer where the e-
mail was opened.44 In addition, this tool provides related
information about when the perpetrator opened the e-mail, how
long the e-mail was kept open, and how long it took the
perpetrator to respond after opening the e-mail. This
information is relevant to building a profile of the perpetrator
and anticipating how to interact with him in an effective
manner to identify him.
44 An IP address is the unique address assigned to every machine on
the Internet and consists of four numbers separated by dots. A web bug, or
pixel tag, is embedded in an HTML-formatted e-mail message sent to the
perpetrator. When the e-mail message is opened, the image tag refers the
user's browser to a lxi pixel transparent picture stored on a web server
under the control of the party embedding the image tag. The web server then
keeps a log of all requests for that image and logs the IP address of the
browsing host, the time and date of the request and also, in these cases, a
referring URL that shows the last URL loaded by the browser so that we can
track what site referred the browser to the web server. This type of image
tag works similarly to the default logging of a web server, i.e., when a user
visits a web site, the web site collects information on the IP address of the
visitor's web browser and the date and time when the visit occurred. This
type of logging is widely used by web sites to track web page activity for
security purposes. Just as a web site tracks the IP address of browsers
accessing the web site, the web bug tracks the IP address of browsers on
computers where the tagged e-mail message is opened and provides
information on when the person opens the e-mail message, the IP address of
the browser used to open the email and what type of browser was used (e.g.,
Microsoft's Internet Explorer, Netscape or Mozilla). It is less intrusive than a
cookie, which web sites place directly on a visitor's hard drive and may be
used to monitor web surfing activities of a user and to capture personally
identifiable data about unsuspecting computer users. Such use of cookies has
been found to raise viable claims of violations of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2701, though not of the
CFAA. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir.
2003) (finding defendants' use of web bugs that collected personal
information about web site visitors by planting cookies on the visitors'
computer hard drives was not violation of ECPA was reversed but district
court judgment of no CFAA violation was not disturbed); In re Intuit Privacy
Litigation, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (plaintiff computer users
who visited website, www.quicken.com, and had cookies surreptitiously
embedded on their hard drives in order to track and record a particular user's
movements across the web failed to show allege any economic damage as
required under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) and that claim was dismissed, but claims
under the ECPA survived motion to dismiss).
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Web bugs such as the one used in this case capture
information generated by the computer system itself, not
content that is generated by the computer user. The CFAA was
intended to protect the privacy and security of computer content
and therefore does not cover computer system information, such
as IP addresses. Yet, absent a definition of "information" in the
statute, the blurry lines in the scope of the CFAA's coverage of
such computer-generated system information must be navigated
by aggressive investigators and clients in crisis, who are
choosing the technical tools necessary to investigate cybercrime.
After a carefully calibrated series of exchanges, the WIFI
Spoofer sent a multi-million dollar extortion demand
threatening to unleash a denial of service attack that would be
made to appear to come from the targeted company and that
would use as a "payload" confidential information on the
company and its clients that he had obtained through "dumpster
diving" of the company's trash bins. The perpetrator revealed
many additional details that were consistent with the
information on the primary suspect we had already identified.
At the same time, the primary suspect was put under
surveillance, which resulted in placing him in the same place -
at a university computer lab - where certain incriminating e-
mails originated.
The FBI then arrested him. When the defendant's house
in Maryland was searched they found not only computers and
other items related to the attempted extortion, but also
firearms, components for hand grenades, and the formula and
items necessary for making ricin, a deadly toxin. He was
detained pending trial, pleaded guilty, and was recently
sentenced to 63 months' imprisonment in October, 2004, for
violating the CFAA provision prohibiting online extortion. Often
in cybersecurity investigations, the threats that the victims are
aware of usually are just the tip of the iceberg.
The story of the WIFI Spoofer had a happy ending, at
least from the perspective of the victimized company. After
almost two years of suffering the repercussions fromof the
spoofed e-mail campaign, it took the concerted investigative
effort of the FBI, the U.S. Attorney's office and a private
cybersecurity firm to track this perpetrator, through use of
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This story also points out how the CFAA may stymie
legitimate self-help efforts to identify perpetrators of harmful
online crimes, and brings full circle the question of the scope of
this statute. From the perspective of the Peeking Politicos in the
case of the Senate Judiciary Committee server spying case, and
of the investigators in the case of the WIFI Spoofer, the reach of
the CFAA was a puzzle. This should be a cautionary note in
future policy debates over topics such as "spyware." Care must
be taken to ensure that legitimate efforts to trace illegal activity
by others are not impaired by regulatory measures written so
broadly and without clear malicious intent requirements that
they suffer from the same scope questions raised by the CFAA.
IV. CONCLUSION
Rapid technological developments in communications
technologies are providing new opportunities for violators to
cover their tracks, new techniques for investigators to pursue
them, and new traps of liability for the reckless computer user.
Tensions are inevitable as these developments test the reach of
current laws and the circumstances in which putative
defendants may find themselves liable and victims may engage
in self-help without themselves crossing ill-defined legal lines. It
would be ironic indeed if the concern over harmful online
activity results in over-regulation of the use of certain
technologies with the effect of hamstringing victims and
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